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Abstract
In this paper we propose a tick time model for dealer quote interactions using
ultra-high-frequency data. This model includes duration functions to measure the
time dependence of volatility as well as information asymmetry. In order to asses
price discovery we dene several measures in tick time. These measures can be ag-
gregated to calendar time and we dene a comparable measure to Hasbrouck (1995)
information shares. In our empirical part we examine the Island and Instinet Elec-
tronic Communication Networks, and three wholesale market makers for 20 actively
traded stocks with varying liquidity at Nasdaq. Our results include that volatility
does not increase with the duration between quote updates, and that longer quote
durations lead to lower price discovery. In terms of price discovery we nd that ECNs
tend to dominate the liquid stocks, whereas market makers dominate the less liquid
stocks.
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Price discovery is the process of how dierent information sources contribute to the evolu-
tion of the underlying value of an asset. In a fragmented market with multiple dealers, like
the Nasdaq, each dealer contributes to the price discovery process. Interesting questions
are which dealer contributes most, how quick the discovery process works, and how it de-
pends on market circumstances like liquidity, volatility and trading intensity. An important
measure for the price discovery contribution of a dealer is the information share dened
by Hasbrouck (1995). Huang (2002) provides an application to a variety of stocks on the
Nasdaq to study the relationship between ECNs (Electronic Communication Networks)
and traditional dealers.
Hasbrouck (1995) denes information shares as the part of the variance of the ran-
dom walk component of returns that can be attributed to a particular market or dealer.
But when quote updates of various dealers are contemporaneously correlated, the variance
decomposition will not be unique. Hasbrouck (1995) suggests alternative Choleski decom-
positions to establish upper and lower bounds. For a particular stock at Nasdaq, Baillie,
Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) show, however, that upper and lower bounds can dier
substantially, even if returns are observed at one minute intervals. When the sampling
frequency is very high this contemporaneous correlation is minimal. For this reason, tick
time data would be the preferred observation frequency. The use of tick time data for
estimating price discovery among Nasdaq dealers is the main topic of this paper.
This paper provides three main contributions. First, we suggest a dierent model for
the dynamics of quote changes. The traditional vector autoregressive of Hasbrouck (1995)
is not suited for tick time data, as it always requires some time aggregation to construct a
vector of quote updates for every time interval. An unobserved components specication
is more suitable for ultra-high frequency data, since it does not require a complete vector
of dealer quotes in each time interval. The model we propose is an extension of Hasbrouck
(1993) to a setting with multiple dealers where quotes arrive in tick time.
Our second contribution is that we allow for duration eects on the quote dynamics.
Time is an important factor in microstructure (Engle and Patton (2004)). It aects the
volatility of the ecient price (Engle (2000)) and it also has an impact on the information
content of dealer quote updates (Dufour and Engle (2000)). Both eects will be included
in the model.
1Our third contribution is the denition of measures for price discovery. These measures
are extensions of the calendar time measures developed by De De Jong and Schotman
(2003) for an unobserved components model. We dene these measures in tick time, where
they are a function of the time between quote innovations. Additionally, we integrate these
measures over time to reect their calendar time equivalents. One of these calendar time
measures resembles the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares. The structural interpretation
of the unobserved components model provides a decomposition that leads to unambiguous
information shares.
In our empirical part we examine the quotes of two ECN's (Island and Instinet) and
three wholesale market makers at Nasdaq for 20 actively traded stocks with varying liq-
uidity. These market makers are selected as the most active in terms of quoting frequency.
For a tick time model it is more natural to consider the quote setting behavior of individual
dealers instead of classes of dealers as in Huang (2002). Considering individual dealers is
also in line with Schultz (2003) who nds a lot of heterogeneity among individual market
makers.
As a preview of the results, we nd that volatility does not evolve in calendar time, but
either in tick time as mentioned by Clark (1973) or even less than tick time (see Dufour
and Engle (2000)). The information ow to the ecient price is in general less at longer
durations. We conrm the hypothesis of Easley and O'Hara (1992), which states that long
durations convey no information. Similar results were found by Dufour and Engle (2000),
and Engle and Patton (2004).
Price discovery measures in tick time appear strongly dependent on durations. Some
dealers reveal information when durations are short whereas others reveal information
when durations are long. Aggregating to calendar time we can often clearly identify the
dominant dealer. In terms of price discovery we nd that ECNs tend to dominate the
liquid stocks, whereas market makers dominate the less liquid stocks. When the interval
over which we aggregate increases, all these measures converge to single point estimates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses specication
and estimation of the model. Section 3 denes the measures for price discovery in tick time
and derives the calendar time aggregation of these measures. In section 4 we discuss the
data. Section 5 presents the results of the model and the price discovery measures. Finally
section 6 concludes.
2Figure 1: Quote Arrivals
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2 A Model for Quotes in Tick Time
In this section we introduce a structural time series model for data in tick time and is an
extension of the unobserved components model as proposed by Hasbrouck (1993). This
model also ts the theoretical framework as proposed by Glosten and Harris (1988).
Consider a dealer market where M dealers issue bid and ask quotes. Quotes arrive
at times t` (` = 1;::: ;L). The time between two consecutive quote arrivals is the quote
duration. We are interested in modelling the dynamics of quote updates conditional on
durations and assume that these durations are exogenous.
When sampling in tick time all quote changes are included. These can be changes in
the bid and/or ask quotes of one or more dealers. In gure 1 we illustrate the quote arrival
process. At t1 dealer 1 increases her bid and ask quote simultaneously. Next at t2, dealer
2 increases only her ask. At time t3 both dealers change one of their quotes.
With M dealers in the market we have 2M dierent time series of quote updates. Let
q` be the 2M-vector of all standing quotes at time t`. The bid (ask) of dealer i corresponds
to element 2i¡1 (2i) of q`. To describe the quote dynamics in a model, we dene I` as the
vector of identities of the quotes that have changed at t`. This vector I` has dimensions
k`£1. When, e.g. dealer i changes her bid at t`, I` has a single element, I` = 2i¡1. When
dealer i changes both bid and ask, I` = (2i¡1;2i). The vector of quotes that are updated
at t` can be written as qI`;`. The time series properties of updated quotes are modelled as
an unobserved components model. These components are a deterministic part (c), which
is a 2M-vector due to the average spread between a quote series and the ecient price.
3This constant deviation captures e.g. the order processing costs the market maker faces.
For a bid we expect negative elements in c, for an ask we expects these elements positive.
The second part is a permanent part (m`), which is common to all dealers. The last part
is a transitory part (u`), which is a 2M-vector of factors not captured by c and m`. This
part captures the informational asymmetries among dealers, but also inventory costs and
other kinds of noise. The decomposition for quotes follows as
qI`;` = cI` + ¶m` + uI`;`; (1)
where ¶ is a unit vector.1 The permanent part, also called the ecient price follows a
random walk, with time dependent volatility (¾`). The impact of time on the volatility
of the price process was questioned by Clark (1973), Harris (1987) and An e and Geman
(2000), among others.
m` = m`¡1 + ¾`r`: (2)




where ¿` is the duration between quotes, normalized by dividing it by the average quote
duration over the whole sample.2 The parameter ±1 measures the impact of quote durations
on the volatility of the random walk. If ±1 = 1
2 the random walk is said to evolve in calendar
time. In this case the variance of (mp¡ms) is equal to (
Pp
`=s+1 ¿`)¾2, and thus proportional
to the length of the calendar time interval. When ±1 = 0 then the variance of the random
walk is not aected by the time between quote updates. In this case the random walk
evolves in tick time. The calendar time variance is proportional to the number of quote
updates (see e.g. Clark (1973)).
The last term in (1) is the transitory term u`, which measures the temporary deviations
from the ecient price and includes asymmetric information, inventory eects and other
sources of noise. To capture the asymmetric information we allow the transitory component
for every dealer, to correlate with the innovation in the ecient price. This is in line with
the theoretical framework of Glosten and Harris (1988), who argue that the prices of
1The length of this unit vector is suppressed at the length of the vector of quote updates.
2This normalization only aects the ¾ parameter, which now refers to the volatility per tick, instead of
the volatility per second.
4informed market participants are correlated with the innovation in the ecient price. The
decomposition for the transitory component therefore reads
uI`;` = ®I`¿
±2
` ¾r` + eI`;`: (4)
where the asymmetric information is captured by ®. We allow this information component
to depend on the duration between quotes. The impact time has on the asymmetric
information is measured by ±2. In case ±2 > 0, quotes become more informative at longer
durations. If ±2 < 0 the opposite holds. The idiosyncratic quote noise (eI`;`) is uncorrelated
with r` and ¿` and has covariance matrix 
.
To estimate the model we put it in state space form for a time series process with





















where J` is a matrix that selects the elements from the quote vector that are updated.
This matrix has dimension 2M £k`. In this case J0
`q` is a k` £1 vector of updated quotes.
This pre-multiplication is applied to all the components that we discussed.
An advantage of putting the model in a state space form is that with some additional
restrictions the parameters c, ®, ±1, ±2, ¾ and 
 can be identied. The rst restriction is
bid and ask deviations from the ecient price are symmetric. This restriction is merely
imposed to reduce the number of parameters in the model. The second restriction is on the
idiosyncratic quote noise (e`). We assume the covariance matrix of this noise term (
) to
have a block diagonal structure. This structure only allows bid and ask quotes of the same
dealer to be correlated. We motivate this structure by the fact that the quote noise includes
inventory eects and a remaining microstructure noise. Theoretical models for inventory
costs adhere to the notion that when a dealer receives inventory she will lower her ask to
induce a trade at the opposite side, but also lowers her bid to avoid receiving additional
inventory. Therefore, a specic dealer may wish to alter both quotes simultaneously due
to the inventory position she has. Simultaneous changes in the quotes of dierent dealers
can be due to asymmetric information both dealers have, which is captured by ® or occurs
by mere chance.
De Jong and Schotman (2003) show that for a model in calendar time, imposing
structure on 
 is necessary for the identication of ®. In tick time there are a few additional
5eects that hinder this identication. When the dimension of the quote vector is one at
each observation, the identication of ® is not guaranteed. Without duration functions ®
can only be identied up to a translation along the unit vector. See Appendix A for a full
derivation. Duration functions help to make identication possible, but only if ±1 6= 0 and
±2 6= 0. When these measures are close to zero identication will be troublesome.
Estimation of (5) is done using the Kalman Filter. As the underlying process is a
random walk, the system cannot be initialized using the long run mean of the underlying
process. We use a diuse prior to initialize the random walk process. To incorporate the
potentially large price change overnight the same approach is followed. Everyday the model
is re-initialized with a diuse prior. The rst 50 observations on each day are excluded in
the maximization of the Likelihood function as the variance of the prediction error has not
converged to normal levels.
As the model considers quote updates, the dimension of the quote vector will frequently
be one. This makes computations in the Kalman Filter recursions straightforward as
determinants and inverses are given. However since this dimension changes over time the
model will not converge to a steady state and the full recursion will have to be computed
for each observation. For this reason the ltering routine is computationally demanding.
3 Price Discovery
In this section we dene price discovery measures in tick time using the unobserved compo-
nents model of the previous section. These tick time measures are subsequently aggregated
to calendar time equivalents.
3.1 Price Discovery in Tick time
We consider three measures to summarize the quote setting behavior of dealers. The rst
measure considers how dealers incorporate information in the ecient price into their quote
innovations. The second measure considers the contribution of quote innovations to the
evolution of the ecient price. The last measure combines both measures in one single
measure, which considers the total information share of dealers.
To explore the implications of the model we consider the following scenario. Suppose
at t` each dealer issues bid and ask quotes, and suppose that the previous ecient price
6m`¡1 is known to all dealers. The quote updates reect both the change in ecient price,
m`¡m`¡1 between t`¡1 and t` and the dealer noise e`. The innovation of the dealer quotes
is then equal to
v` = q` ¡ E`¡1[q`] = ¶(m` ¡ m`¡1) + u`
= (¶ + ®¿
±2¡±1
` )(m` ¡ m`¡1) + e`:
(6)
The amount of information in the ecient price that is incorporated into quotes is
referred to as dealer eciency. The more of the innovation in the random walk that is
incorporated in dealer quotes, the more ecient they are. To obtain a measure for dealer
eciency we consider the covariance between quote updates as a fraction of the total
variance of the random walk
¯(¿) = Cov(v`m`)=V ar(m`) = ¶ + ®¿
(±2¡±1); (7)
which is a function of the duration of quote innovations. The crucial parameters are ®, ±1
and ±2. At long durations this measure will converge to 1 when ±1 > ±2, and diverge in the
opposite case. The sign of ® determines whether 1 is an upper or a lower bound for the
respective element in ¯(¿). When ® is larger than zero, ¯(¿) will be larger than one. This
indicates that this quote incorporates more information of the random walk and vice versa.
Hence whether a dealer is more or less ecient depends solely on the sign of ®. Whether
this eciency persists over long or short durations is dependent on the values of ±1 and ±2.
For the second measure we consider a variance decomposition of the ecient price
similar to Hasbrouck's (1995) analysis of price discovery. It relates the change in the
ecient price to innovations in dealer quotes,
m` = °(¿)
0v` + "`; (8)
where the regression coecients °(¿) are dened as
°(¿) = V ar(v`)
¡1Cov(v`m`): (9)




























1 + ¾2¿2±1(¶ + ®¿±2¡±1)0
¡1(¶ + ®¿±2¡±1)
: (13)







Hence this measure combines the dealer eciency measure and the amount of idiosyncratic
noise each dealer quote has.
The last measure resembles the information shares of Hasbrouck (1995). These are
dened as the proportional contribution of dealer quote innovations to the innovation
in the ecient price. This is determined by considered how much of the variance of the
ecient price can be explained by the variance in quote innovations. This can be expressed
in terms of the R2 of regression (8). From standard regression theory it is known that this




Hasbrouck (1995) information shares have the characteristic that they cannot be assigned
to dealers uniquely. Given that the matrix inversion lemma can be applied and the block
diagonal structure of 
, R2(¿) can be decomposed as the sum of the information shares
per dealer (ISi(¿)).
3.2 Calendar Time Aggregation
In the previous section we discussed price discovery and eciency of single quote updates.
This section denes similar measures of quote setting behavior over time. To obtain these
measures we aggregate the tick time measures to xed time intervals. Let us rst establish
the relationship between tick time and calendar time. In calendar time we refer to t as the
present time and t+1 as the time at the next time interval. Let Q(t) be the vector of quotes
8at time t. Assume that deviations from the ecient price are included in the information
set of all dealers. In calendar time innovations in dealer quotes are decomposed as
V (t) = Q(t) ¡ Et¡1[Q(t)] = ¶(m(t) ¡ m(t ¡ 1)) + u(t): (16)
The innovation in quotes is equal to the change in the ecient price plus the noise around
this ecient price. To establish the link between calendar time and tick time, let `t
represent the observation closest to time t. The tick time equivalent (16) is
v`t = ¶(m`t ¡ m`t¡1) + u`t: (17)
The change in the ecient price from `t¡1 to `t is the sum of all interjacent changes. We
write (17) as the sum of these changes
v`t = ¶(m`t ¡ m`t¡1) + u`t = ¶
`t X
j=`t¡1+1
(mj ¡ mj¡1) + u`t: (18)
Dealer eciency is considered as the change in the dealer quotes that can be attributed
to the change in the ecient price. This is the regression coecient of quote innovations
regressed on the change in the ecient price. We obtain this measure by considering the
covariance of quote innovations with the change in the ecient price as a fraction of the
total variance caused by the ecient price. The covariance follows as























The variance of the random walk is







The measure for dealer eciency follows from this,








Again ¯(t) is a re-scaling of ®. As the interval between `t and `t¡1 increases, ¯(t) converges
to unity. Thus when intervals are larger, dealers incorporate information about the true
9price more eciently into their quotes. The rate of convergence is dependent on ®, ±1 and
±2. Depending on the sign of ® this convergence will occur from above (® > 0) or below
(® < 0). When convergence in ¯(t) occurs quickly then dealers quote eciently in this
stock.
For price discovery we consider the reverse regression as for dealer eciency. We con-
sider the change in the ecient price that can be attributed to innovations in dealer quotes
°(t)
0 = Cov(V`t;(m`t ¡ m`t¡1))(t)
¡1: (22)
The variance of quote innovations follows as





















This matrix depends on all the interjacent durations from `t¡1 to `t. Therefore the inverse
of this matrix is not straightforward. To extract the duration dependence, the matrix
inversion lemma needs to be applied twice. For the sake of notational comfort the inverse
is not displayed.
As mentioned before information shares are determined by the R2 of the regression
of dealer quotes on the ecient price. Again this measure is the inner product of dealer




Here the inversion lemma does not only extract the durations form the calculation of the
inverse. For information shares this lemma is needed to assign them to dealers individually.
As the inverse of (t) is a function of the inverse of 
, which was known to have a block
diagonal structure, these information shares can be assigned uniquely.
When the sampling interval increases the change in dealer quotes will to a large extent
represent the change in the ecient price. As a consequence R2(t) converges to one. This
convergence of R2(t) will be related to the convergence of ¯(t) to a unit vector. Although
stated without proof, if R2(t) and ¯(t) converge to unity, then the sum of the elements in
°(t) add up to one. As the covariance between quote innovations and the change in the
random walk is positive, as well as the variance of the random walk, elements in °(t), will
converge to single point estimates between zero and one.
10The total value of R2(t) indicates how much microstructure noise there is left in dealer
quotes. Results from this could have consequences for e.g. the sampling intervals used for
realized volatility as described by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2001). When
R2(t) is low there is still a lot of microstructure noise in the data and longer sampling
intervals should be used.
4 Data
The data used in this study is provided by Nastraq. This data set contains all trades and
quotes that occur within normal trading hours at Nasdaq. From this data set we consider
dealer quote data. This provides all quotes issued within trading hours, time stamped to
the nearest second. Most important, it contains the identity of the dealer that issues the
quote. For our study we select 20 highly traded companies with dierent liquidity listed
at Nasdaq for February 1999. The selected stock and their ticker symbols are reported in
table 1. Huang (2002) uses the same data set as ours in 1999 but uses dierent months
in his study. He creates categories of dierent types of dealers. Schultz (2003) argues
that dealer quoting behavior is heterogeneously, hence we consider individual dealers. We
consider the dealer quotes of the 5 largest dealers, in terms of quoting frequency. This
leads to the selection of 2 ECNs, Island and Instinet, and 3 market makers, which change
depending on the stock considered.
The data provided needs to be ltered before it can be used in the model. As we
consider the innovation in a quote (either bid or ask quote) the other quotes are removed
from the data. First, when multiple quotes are issued at the same second, the last quote
in this sequence is selected.3 Second, a change in the depth of the quote is not considered.
All quotes that do not change the bid or ask are removed. When a dealer only updates a
bid this is the only quote that we will consider in the model. Due to this selection criteria
the number of newly issued quotes is often 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Another issue is the treatment of outliers. When a dealer is unwilling to trade she
3Especially in the case of Island this occurs frequently. This is caused since there are many small trades
matched within Island itself. Every time this happens Island will send the new best standing quote to
Nasdaq, which in many cases in merely a change in the depth of the quote
11will issue a quote far away from the inside (best quote in the market). This can happen
regularly on one side of the market when a dealer is unwilling to take more inventory.
Although these quotes send a very strong signal to the other marker participants, this is
something not considered here as we address the issues of price discovery. We dene an
outlier as a quote that is more than $ 2 away from the average of the past 50 quotes. These
outliers are deleted.
Table 2 reports some summary statistics of the data after ltering. The rst column
reports the total number of quotes given by dealers in each stock. Our data set incorporates
very liquid stocks like DELL as well as illiquid stocks like SBUX. The second column report
the fraction of single quote updates. In section 2 we discussed the identication problems
that could occur. The number of quotes is inversely related to the duration between quotes.
Further note that there is a weak relationship between the percentage of single quotes and
the total number of quotes issued. The other issue that can lead to identication problems
is the variance in durations. These seem to be large enough not to cause any identication
problems.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
5 Results
This section provides the results of the model in section 2 and the measures of price
discovery discussed in section 3.
5.1 Parameter Estimates
In this part we discuss the parameter estimates from model (5). In table 3 we report the
estimates for the duration parameters, including their standard errors. The parameter ±1
measures the duration eect on the innovation in the ecient price. This parameter is
signicantly negative in 50% of the cases or zero in most other cases. For most stocks the
random walk evolves in tick time or we nd that long durations between quotes decreases
the volatility of the random walk, which is consistent with the ndings of Dufour and Engle
(2000). The value of ±1 = 1
2, which represents a random walk in calendar time can easily
be rejected.
12INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The parameter ±2 measures the duration dependence of the asymmetric information. In
most cases this parameter is negative and more negative than ±1. Longer durations between
quote updates result in less asymmetric information about the ecient price. Hence at
short durations quotes are more informative. These results are similar to the ndings of
Dufour and Engle (2000) and Engle and Patton (2004). They nd that the price impact
of trades is larger at short durations. Our results also conrm the reasoning of Easley and
O'Hara (1992). Their model hypothesizes that long durations convey no information. The
combined results of the duration parameters indicate that short durations means higher
volatility, and more asymmetric information. As a consequence volatile periods are periods
where asymmetries are large and vice versa.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
In table 4 we report the ®'s from (5) including their standard errors. An ® signicantly
larger/smaller than zero means that this dealer has more/less exposure the innovation in
the ecient price than the average of dealers. Although these ®'s are not that informative
on their own, they do indicate large heterogeneity among the dierent dealers. Moreover
it also indicates the heterogeneity present in the bid and ask quotes themselves. This
heterogeneity among stocks will cause dierent results when discussing price discovery. It
also indicates that dealer cannot just be grouped in categories as their characteristics are
very dierent among individual dealers.
5.2 Price Discovery in Quote Updates
In this section we discuss the results of these measure per quote update.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
To discuss dealer eciency we consider the innovations in quotes that are due to a
change in the ecient price. This measure is a re-scaling of the ®'s reported before, and
is dependent on the duration estimates for their convergence. In most of the cases ±1 is
larger than ±2, which means that for long durations the estimate for ¯(¿) will converge to
one. This is expected, as when there is a long time between quote updates, the change in
13quotes is likely to be caused by a change in the ecient price. As the measures for ¯(¿)
are duration dependent, they cannot be shown in a table. In gure 2 we draw ¯(¿) for
three specic stocks in the sample as a function of duration. These stocks were selected
to represent liquid stocks (INTC), less liquid stocks (CMGI) and illiquid stocks (AAPL).
For all stocks ¯(¿) converges to one, as ±2 < ±1. Even when durations are as long as
one minute, the change in quotes can still not be explained fully by the change in the
underlying price. As there was heterogeneity among the ®'s of the dierent stock there is
the same heterogeneity in ¯(¿).
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
For measures of price discovery in tick time we perform the reverse regression of the
ecient price on quote innovations. We consider to what extend a single innovation in a
dealer quote can explain the change in the ecient price. Again this measure is duration
dependent and should be considered relatively with respect to Island. In gure 3 we show
the same stocks as before. The dynamics of these estimates cannot be derived straightfor-
ward from the parameters as for ¯(¿). In the case of INTC we see a clear dominance of
the ECNs over the market makers. The price discovery is highest at very short durations,
and declines rapidly when durations get longer. However for INTC durations most often
are very short. For CMGI, Island dominates persistently. The price discovery for Island
does not decrease as the durations increase. An explanation for this is that the ®'s for
Island are close to zero and the duration parameter ±2 is also close to zero. For AAPL we
see a similar pattern as for INTC. Interesting is the crossing line for MM1 and MM2 at
very short durations.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
The information shares we consider are determined by the R2 of the regression of the
change in the ecient price on the innovation in dealer quotes. This is the inner product
of ¯(¿) and °(¿). This R2(¿) is decomposed to dealer specic parts using the structure
of the model. In gure 4 we present the graphs for the three stocks. As a general results
information shares are highest at short durations. For INTC the dominance of Island is
obvious. For CMGI MM2 dominates and for AAPL Instinet leads in terms of information
shares. Another general result is that for CMGI the information share of a tick is much
higher than that of the other two stocks.
145.3 Calendar time aggregated Price Discovery
In the previous part we discussed some results for the information content of quote inno-
vations. When these measures are aggregated over time, these provide useful information
on the total eciency of dealer as well as stocks and allow us to determine the total price
contribution of dealers. Another benet of time aggregation is that the measure we nd
can be compared to traditional measures, like Hasbrouck (1995) information shares. In
this part we aggregate to one-minute and 5-minute intervals, as these intervals are most
commonly used in other research.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
We again start by discussing dealer eciency. In table 5 we report these measures in
60 second intervals and 300 second intervals. Depending on the sign of ®, these measures
are higher or lower than one. As mentioned when the time period over which we aggregate
grows, these measures should converge to one. This convergence is clearly seen for all of
the stocks in the sample. Many stocks have achieved this convergence after ve-minutes,
like INTC, but for the less liquid stocks there are still some ineciencies (see e.g. QWST).
In gure 5 we show the distributions of ¯(t) for the three stocks that we evaluate at 60 and
300 seconds. The results from these graphs again proof the heterogeneity among dealers.
It also displays the skewed distribution of this measure.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
The same is done for the measure of price discovery in table 6. A general result that can
be seen is that price discovery increases when the sampling interval gets larger. At both
sampling intervals we see that Island has very high measures for price discovery compared
to the other dealers, especially for the more liquid stocks in the sample. These measures
can again be shown in distribution plots in gure 6. We show these distributions for three
stocks that we have selected and only show the asks. Clearly when the sampling interval
gets larger the distributions converge to a point estimate. In contrast to information shares,
our measure benets from time aggregation. The longer the sampling interval the more
15precisely we can assign information shares uniquely. In the case of INTC and CMGI Island
clearly dominates the price discovery process. For AAPL after ve minutes there is still
no convergence to xed points.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
Finally we consider the R2(t) of the regression when we aggregate over time. By
applying the inversion lemma twice, this R2(t) can be decomposed and information shares
can be assigned uniquely. Results for information shares per dealer are shown in table 7.
Again comparing the 60 and 300 second interval we see that information shares increase.
Interesting is the total dominance of specic market makers for the stocks PSFT and
SBUX. Another interesting result is that we never nd any dominance Instinet. This is in
contrast to the ndings of Huang (2002). In gure 7 we show these R2(t) per dealer for
the three stocks. These show the same pattern as the graphs for °(t). This is because the
measure for ¯(t) converge to one and the R2(t) is the sum of the elements in °(t).
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE
In gure 8 we show the total sum of the R2(t) for a one-, two- and ve-minute interval.
With these graphs we can discuss the eciency of the stock as a whole. When we move
to longer sampling intervals more information is incorporated in the ecient price of the
stock. In the case of INTC and CMGI, this information is almost fully incorporated after
ve minutes. In the case of AAPL we see that after ve minutes there is still a lot of
specic dealer noise.
Implications of this also run into a dierent eld of research. When measuring real-
ized volatility of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2001) one usually samples at
5-minute intervals. For the most liquid stocks this seems to be a good sampling inter-
val as most information is incorporated in the stock. However for the less liquid stock
microstructure eects can still dominate the movement of the stock price and thus the
assumed convergence to the total integrated volatility does not hold.
166 Conclusion
This paper introduced a model for dealer quoting behavior in tick time. Quote innova-
tions are modelled as they arrive and the model can be estimated using a Kalman Filter.
From the model we derived measures for dealer eciency and price discovery in tick time.
Consequently these measures were aggregated to calendar time equivalents. We showed
that when these measures are aggregated over a suciently long period of time, these will
converge to single point estimates for price discovery.
In our empirical results we nd that more volatility is generated at shorter durations.
We also nd that dealer quotes tend to be more informative when durations are short.
Using the measures for price discovery we can identify the information share of the dealer
examined.
Finally the results for the calendar time aggregation, indicate that for some stocks,
the microstructure noise in the price process is still relatively large. This implies that at
a sampling interval of ve minutes quotes are still noisy. Hence measures like realized
volatility, for some stocks might still be noise approximations of the real volatility.
A Derivation of the Moment conditions
This appendix discusses the identication problems that can arise. The assumption that
there will be only one quote update leads to the restriction that J0
`¶ = 1. To make this
point consider no variation in durations. Hence the duration functions can be left out for






















































Note that the variance is driven only by the information in the last observation and that
the rst order auto covariance is driven by the lagged information. To show that ® cannot
be identied uniquely, dene
_ ® ´ ® + x¶ (28)
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Hence the model stated cannot identify the parameters in the ® vector uniquely. When


































































The vector ® can now be identied uniquely i durations change over time. When these
durations are xed a linear substitute can be found in the way shown before and the vector
® cannot be identied.
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21Figure 2: Tick time measure for dealer eciency (¯(¿)) as a function of duration











































Note: These graphs show the dealer eciency measures in tick time for INTC, CMGI and AAPL. These
measures are plotted as a function of duration.
22Figure 3: Tick time measure for price discovery (°(¿)) as a function of duration













































Note: These graphs show the price discovery measures in tick time for INTC, CMGI and AAPL. These
measures are plotted as a function of duration.
23Figure 4: Tick time measure for Information Shares as a function of duration










































Note: These graphs show information shares in tick time for INTC, CMGI and AAPL per dealer. These
measures are plotted as a function of duration.
24Figure 5: Dealer eciency in Calendar time
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the calendar time measures for dealer eciency. These
distributions are shown for the bids of INTC, CMGI and AAPL. Island is not shown as its value is always
1. The aggregates are shown at 60 and 300 second intervals.
25Figure 6: Price Discovery in Calendar time
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the calendar time measures for price discovery. These
distributions are shown for the asks of INTC, CMGI and AAPL. The aggregates are shown at 60 and 300
second intervals.
26Figure 7: Information Shares in Calendar time per dealer
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the calendar time measures for Information Shares. These
distributions are shown for INTC, CMGI and AAPL. The aggregates are shown at 60 and 300 second
intervals. This measure is obtained by taking the inner product of the measure for dealer eciency and
price discovery. Using the specic structure of the model and by applying the matrix inversion lemma, the
inner product can be decomposed to dealers.
27Figure 8: Calendar time aggregated Information
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the total information incorporated in dealer quotes over a
specic time interval. These distributions are shown for INTC, CMGI and AAPL. The aggregates are
shown at 60, 120 and 300 second intervals.
28Table 1: List of Company Ticker symbols and Company names
Ticker Symbol Company name
AAPL Apple Computer Inc.
AMAT Applied Materials Inc.
AMGN Amgen Inc.
AMZN Amazon.com, Inc.




CSCO Cisco Systems Inc.




NXTL Nextel Communications CL-A
ORCL Oracle Corporation
PSFT Peoplesoft Inc.
QWST Qwest Communications Intl Inc.
SBUX Starbucks Corporation
SUNW Sun Microsystems Inc.
WCOM MCI WorldCom Inc.
29Table 2: Summary statistics
Stock # of Obs % of single quotes Average Duration Std of Duration
AAPL 29,787 89.63 15.71 28.73
AMAT 105,090 83.58 4.77 5.95
AMGN 40,279 83.97 12.32 22.24
AMZN 150,710 80.52 3.44 4.39
ATHM 76,435 86.50 6.34 9.40
CMGI 90,401 87.06 5.34 7.75
COMS 61,049 89.56 7.68 11.34
CPWR 33,301 90.55 13.92 31.03
CSCO 164,480 80.85 3.13 3.52
DELL 177,850 77.39 3.02 3.44
INTC 171,260 76.92 3.15 3.56
MSFT 151,110 80.82 3.42 3.94
NOVL 18,909 87.88 25.08 43.93
NXTL 19,556 91.63 23.42 42.23
ORCL 87,774 85.81 5.56 7.46
PSFT 24,601 91.12 18.74 32.02
QWST 44,459 88.331 10.68 18.12
SBUX 14,320 90.056 32.43 64.92
SUNW 128,370 82.43 4.20 5.15
WCOM 88,550 83.33 5.66 7.41
Note: This table presents some summary statistics of the data after being ltered.
Column 1 represents the total number of quotes issued for each stock. Column 2
indicates in how many cases there is only 1 quote innovation in the observation
matrix. Column 3 gives the average duration between any quote updates and column
4 gives the respective standard deviation.
30Table 3: Duration Parameters
Stock ±1 ±2
AAPL -0.06 (0.03) -0.44 (0.05)
AMAT 0.02 (0.02) -1.20 (0.17)
AMGN 0.04 (0.02) -0.21 (0.17)
AMZN 0.03 (0.01) 0.50 (0.02)
ATHM 0.01 (0.02) -1.26 (0.18)
CMGI 0.07 (0.01) -0.11 (0.04)
COMS -0.11 (0.02) -0.51 (0.06)
CPWR 0.00 (0.02) -0.72 (0.13)
CSCO -0.07 (0.01) -0.24 (0.04)
DELL -0.13 (0.01) -0.30 (0.03)
INTC -0.17 (0.02) -0.23 (0.04)
MSFT -0.20 (0.02) -0.13 (0.03)
NOVL -0.23 (0.04) -0.59 (0.05)
NXTL -0.05 (0.03) -0.44 (0.08)
ORCL 0.02 (0.02) -0.82 (0.05)
PSFT 0.00 (0.02) -0.23 (0.03)
QWST -0.14 (0.02) 0.23 (0.03)
SBUX -0.01 (0.03) -0.32 (0.06)
SUNW -0.06 (0.02) -0.96 (0.11)
WCOM -0.11 (0.02) -1.17 (0.14)
Note: This table reports the estimates and standard errors of the













` r` + J0
`e`;
Column 1 gives the duration parameters on the random walk com-
ponent, column 2 reports the duration parameters of the correlation
between dealer quotes and the random walk.
31Table 4: Quote specic relations to the ecient price
Stock ISLDb ISLDa INCAb INCAa MM1b MM1a MM2b MM2a MM3b MM3a
AAPL -1.02 -0.56 1.24 0.58 3.17 2.01 0.98 -1.49 -0.82 -0.21
(0.20) (0.21) (0.37) (0.26) (0.40) (0.35) (0.19) (0.25) (0.36) (0.28)
AMAT -0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.38 0.49 0.33 -0.08 -0.12 0.02 -0.63
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.19)
AMGN -1.59 -0.69 0.13 0.14 -1.44 -0.97 -1.70 -1.70 0.17 -0.13
(0.43) (0.42) (0.20) (0.28) (0.69) (0.60) (0.93) (1.09) (0.41) (0.43)
AMZN 0.00 0.12 0.93 1.38 -0.33 -0.66 -0.97 -5.21 -0.12 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.20) (0.18)
ATHM -0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.04 0.38 0.28 -0.15 -0.16 -0.13 -0.17
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
CMGI -0.35 -0.61 0.35 0.44 -0.39 -0.11 1.68 1.39 -1.03 -1.46
(0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.23)
COMS -0.07 -0.02 1.27 0.79 -1.21 -1.02 0.00 -0.24 0.00 1.49
(0.08) (0.07) (0.17) (0.18) (0.28) (0.30) (0.14) (0.22) (0.17) (0.28)
CPWR -0.22 -0.31 -0.12 0.04 0.59 0.37 0.79 0.89 0.12 -0.26
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.21) (0.19) (0.32) (0.36) (0.18) (0.18)
CSCO -0.41 -0.42 0.44 0.48 0.55 0.03 0.76 0.80 -3.00 -2.92
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23)
DELL -0.47 -0.47 0.12 0.26 4.54 5.34 0.01 0.60 -2.39 -2.84
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.34) (0.37) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18)
INTC 0.00 -0.35 -0.28 -0.03 0.67 1.04 -1.39 -1.01 -1.39 -1.55
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (0.20) (0.19)
MSFT -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 0.05 -0.81 -0.18 -1.31 -1.22 -2.80 -2.73
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.23) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
NOVL 1.16 -0.07 1.69 0.16 1.73 -2.58 0.30 1.00 0.15 -0.07
(0.32) (0.12) (0.28) (0.11) (0.32) (0.44) (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16)
NXTL -1.44 -1.25 -0.49 -0.01 1.89 1.23 1.51 -1.32 0.16 -1.50
(0.39) (0.42) (0.23) (0.34) (0.45) (0.42) (0.48) (0.62) (0.20) (0.38)
ORCL -0.34 -0.46 0.20 -0.04 2.62 -2.15 -0.27 -0.05 -0.42 -0.26
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.22) (0.18) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15)
PSFT 0.93 -0.43 1.90 0.18 11.98 9.51 8.09 9.20 -0.24 2.33
(0.36) (0.21) (0.30) (0.26) (1.44) (1.28) (1.03) (1.14) (0.54) (0.56)
QWST 0.99 0.22 4.57 5.46 -0.45 0.23 2.79 3.44 0.70 0.37
(0.69) (0.43) (0.47) (0.42) (0.42) (0.63) (0.71) (1.11) (0.19) (0.21)
SBUX 0.14 -0.08 1.21 0.22 1.87 1.28 -0.52 -1.10 -0.27 -0.16
(0.19) (0.32) (0.34) (0.23) (0.41) (0.31) (0.34) (0.43) (0.24) (0.19)
SUNW -0.08 -0.31 -0.04 0.00 -0.55 -0.50 -1.07 -1.61 0.10 0.10
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.14) (0.19) (0.27) (0.11) (0.13)
WCOM -0.02 -0.12 0.24 -0.13 0.65 0.49 -0.26 -0.36 0.17 -0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.17) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)













` r` + J0
`e`:
The subscripts b and a represent the respective bid or ask side of a dealer.
32Table 5: Average values for dealer eciency (¯(t)) per dealer quote
Stock ISLDb ISLDa INCAb INCAa MM1b MM1a MM2b MM2a MM3b MM3a
60 Second intervals
AAPL 0.89 0.94 1.13 1.06 1.34 1.22 1.11 0.84 0.91 0.98
AMAT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
AMGN 0.81 0.92 1.02 1.02 0.83 0.89 0.80 0.80 1.02 0.98
AMZN 1.00 1.02 1.14 1.21 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.22 0.98 0.99
ATHM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CMGI 0.98 0.96 1.02 1.03 0.97 0.99 1.12 1.10 0.93 0.90
COMS 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.05 0.92 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.10
CPWR 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.01 0.99
CSCO 0.98 0.98 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.03 0.87 0.87
DELL 0.98 0.98 1.01 1.01 1.19 1.23 1.00 1.03 0.90 0.88
INTC 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.05 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.93
MSFT 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.92 0.93 0.83 0.84
NOVL 1.17 0.99 1.25 1.02 1.26 0.62 1.04 1.15 1.02 0.99
NXTL 0.82 0.84 0.94 1.00 1.24 1.16 1.19 0.83 1.02 0.81
ORCL 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.07 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
PSFT 1.16 0.93 1.33 1.03 3.05 2.63 2.39 2.58 0.96 1.40
QWST 1.52 1.11 3.39 3.85 0.76 1.12 2.46 2.80 1.37 1.19
SBUX 1.02 0.99 1.21 1.04 1.33 1.23 0.91 0.80 0.95 0.97
SUNW 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00
WCOM 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
300 Second intervals
AAPL 0.97 0.99 1.03 1.02 1.08 1.05 1.03 0.96 0.98 0.99
AMAT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AMGN 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.00
AMZN 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.05 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.81 1.00 1.00
ATHM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CMGI 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.02 0.98 0.98
COMS 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02
CPWR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00
CSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.97 0.97
DELL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.98
INTC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
MSFT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97
NOVL 1.04 1.00 1.06 1.01 1.07 0.90 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.00
NXTL 0.96 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.06 1.04 1.05 0.96 1.01 0.95
ORCL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
PSFT 1.04 0.98 1.08 1.01 1.47 1.38 1.32 1.36 0.99 1.09
QWST 1.12 1.03 1.54 1.65 0.95 1.03 1.33 1.41 1.08 1.04
SBUX 1.01 1.00 1.06 1.01 1.10 1.07 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.99
SUNW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
WCOM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: This table reports the averages for dealer eciency (¯(t)) per dealer quote. This measure is dened
as the covariance between quote innovations and the change in the ecient price, divided by the variance
of the ecient price change. Panel A shows this measure aggregated up to 60 seconds, panel B up to 300
seconds. All measures over time converge to 1.
33Table 6: Average values for price discovery (°(t)) per dealer quote
Stock ISLDb ISLDa INCAb INCAa MM1b MM1a MM2b MM2a MM3b MM3a
60 Second intervals
AAPL 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02
AMAT 0.14 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
AMGN 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04
AMZN 0.30 0.38 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01
ATHM 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03
CMGI 0.24 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02
COMS 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
CPWR 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
CSCO 0.30 0.32 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
DELL 0.34 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
INTC 0.12 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02
MSFT 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
NOVL 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
NXTL 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
ORCL 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05
PSFT 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
QWST 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.05
SBUX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
SUNW 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
WCOM 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02
300 Second intervals
AAPL 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04
AMAT 0.19 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03
AMGN 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06
AMZN 0.32 0.41 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01
ATHM 0.20 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04
CMGI 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03
COMS 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
CPWR 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
CSCO 0.37 0.40 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
DELL 0.39 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
INTC 0.19 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.02
MSFT 0.26 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
NOVL 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
NXTL 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06
ORCL 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.07
PSFT 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03
QWST 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.11
SBUX 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
SUNW 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
WCOM 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03
Note:This table reports the averages for price discovery (°(t)) per dealer quote. This measure is ob-
tained from the regression of the ecient price change on quote innovations. Panel A shows this measure
aggregated up to 60 seconds, panel B up to 300 seconds.
34Table 7: Averages for Information shares per dealer
60 seconds 300 seconds
Stock Island Instinet MM1 MM2 MM3 Island Instinet MM1 MM2 MM3
AAPL 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.08
AMAT 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.50 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.06
AMGN 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.11 0.12
AMZN 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
ATHM 0.26 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.39 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.07
CMGI 0.46 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.55 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.06
COMS 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.32 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11
CPWR 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.12 0.07
CSCO 0.61 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06
DELL 0.74 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.87 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
INTC 0.29 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.46 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.05
MSFT 0.28 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.49 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.08
NOVL 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.06
NXTL 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.14
ORCL 0.23 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.36 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.12
PSFT 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
QWST 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.21
SBUX 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.01 0.01
SUNW 0.23 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.39 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.08
WCOM 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.06
Note: This table reports the averages for information shares per dealer. This measure is obtained as the
inner product of ¸(t) and µ(t). The matrix inversion lemma is used to assign the information shares to
separate dealers. This is possible as we impose structure on the idiosyncratic dealer noise. We reports the
measure aggregated up to 60 seconds and 300 seconds.
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